What is the effect of electoral rules on political corruption? While the influence of electoral systems on accountability and representation has been widely studied, the link between electoral systems and corruption remains sparse. This paper develops a model for the interplay between corruption and electoral rules, considering the incentives for challengers to expose the corruption undertaken by the incumbents. I identify two major components: first, rules that increase competition create incentives for free-riding, as challengers would prefer that other challengers pay the cost of exposure. Second, larger district sizes create coordination problems, as the same incumbent may be overexposed, while others were not exposed at all. These characteristics make a mix of high competitiveness and PR the worst system regarding incentives for corruption. I show that these predictions hold empirically using quasi-experimental data from Brazilian municipalities. This study has implications for the design of electoral institutions.
What is the effect of legislature size on public service provision? While the literature relates legislature size to representation and government expenditure, its implications for welfare remain understudied. In this paper, we investigate the effects of legislature size on welfare, exploiting exogenous changes in city-council size in Brazil between 2005 and 2008. We show that adding a legislator improves education and health care. However, the results prove true for the services that are believed to be highly salient to voters and are easiest to claim credit for. In this sense, education quality and preventive health care remain unaffected while primary school enrollment and infant mortality significantly improve. To investigate the mechanism, we surveyed former councilors and analyzed 346,553 bills proposed by municipalities in the period. This analysis largely corroborates our findings, showing that politicians prefer to provide private and local public goods. This paper has implications for the design of legislative institutions. [Full Appendix]
Predatory elections: how norms of democracy and the rural economy incentivize electoral violence and fraud (with R. Sexton)
In this paper, we present a formal theory of captured electoral democracy in which local bosses or caudillos in peripheral regions use violence and/or fraud deliver votes for the ruling party in exchange for wide authority to extract economic rents between elections. This electoral pressure incentivizes citizens to evade the local agents of the state, but their capacity to do so depends on the viability of their outside “subsistence” option. We empirically test and find support for the theory in two highly divergent cases: Paraguay and Afghanistan. Using exogenous variation in drought conditions, we show that a strong outside option for citizen dramatically increases the level of electoral fraud in ruling party vote totals, while decreasing the level of violent coercion voters are exposed to. These results suggest that there is a dark side to international norms of democracy in weakly institutionalized settings: when economic times are tough for rural voters, elections expose them to increased violence, without any real chance to affect the outcome of the election.
Investment capacity and the electoral marketplace: evidence from Brazil (with V. Araújo, M. Izumi, and F. Limongi)
The importance of money in elections is a hallmark of contemporary democracies. In this paper, we study how investment capacity, defined as the resources remaining after the municipality perform the mandatory expenditures, influences elections in Brazil. We theorize that when a politician wins the election in a low investment capacity municipality, this generates commitment problems, as new mayors are unable to reward the firms that contributed to their campaigns, influencing the next elections. We test these claims by considering a close-elections regression discontinuity design coupled with heterogeneous quantile effects for Brazilian municipalities between 2000 and 2012. We find that incumbent mayors in towns with low investment capacity receive less campaign donation afterward and are more disadvantaged in their reelection contests. The results are robust to design variations and changes in party labels or mayoral characteristics. Our findings have implications for the influence of money on politics in democratic countries.
The Effect of Legislature Size on Public Spending: A Meta-Analysis (with H. Alptekin, D. Freire, and C. Roman)
In a seminal article, Weingast et al. (1981) argue that there is a positive relationship between legislature size and inefficiency in public expenditures. Their proposition is currently known as the “law of 1/n” and has been widely cited by scholars in political science and public administration. However, recent studies have questioned the validity of the theory. In this paper, we estimate the first meta-analysis of the relationship between the number of legislators and public spending. Based on a sample of 26 empirical studies, we find little effect of legislature size on government budgets. The available evidence suggests that, if such an effect exists, it is driven by an increase in the upper chamber, but there is considerable heterogeneity in the results. Our meta-regressions also indicate that study coefficients vary significantly according to modeling specifications, such as estimation method or variable selection.
Work in Progress
International institutions and rogue states deterrence (with C. Hafer)
What is the effect of International Institutions on Rogue State’s deterrence? While some policymakers believe that institutions like the UN mostly provide the Rogue States information and time to take their actions, others advocate that they may create effective means to deter and slow down the Rogue States. In this paper, we develop a model containing two critical features in the Rogue States deterrence interaction. First, the fact that countries have incomplete information about the resolve the Rogue State has to carry on with the aggression. Second, those countries have incomplete information about how much the other countries are being harmed by the Rogue State’s actions. We show that all players, regardless of their types, prefer some form of an international institution that no institutions. However, there is no consensus on which institution countries should use. We derive the institutional setting that generates the maximum ex-ante level of deterrence, and we show that Rogue State’s aggressions are monotonic in the level of deterrence. This implies that conditional on fighting, the fights are more costly the higher the deterrence levels. Our results have implications for the design of international security institutions.
Mosquito-borne diseases are among the leading causes of death in humans. The recent Zika virus epidemics in Brazil highlight the dangers of the Aedes Aegypti, especially for infants and pregnant women. Since the efforts to combat the outbreak are usually driven by community-based health interventions, we propose a field experiment to measure how to optimally incentivize the community health care agents in Brazil. The experiment will consist of hired and trained subjects to visit houses and help residents to identify Aedes Aegypti breeding sites. We will randomly assign performance monetary rewards and pro-social incentives to subjects. Their performance will be monitored using cell phone data and position. After the intervention, we will apply a post-treatment survey, and during six months we will monitor the incidence of diseases transmitted by the Aedes Aegypti (mainly Dengue, Zika, and Chikungunya). Our goal is to measure the impact of the overall intervention, and also to find the optimal combination of incentives to maximize the benefits of these policies.