I am a PhD Candidate at the Wilf Family Department of Politics, New York University. My work concentrates in the fields of Comparative Political Economy and International Politics, investigating how institutional designs affect incentives and welfare.

In my recent working papers I study how electoral systems and competition  affects corruption, how legislature size influences welfare in Brazilian municipalities, and how international institutions influence rogue state’s deterrence. Here you find information about my recent work.

I am currently designing an experiment to measure how incentives impact health care provision in Brazil.



The Wilf Family Department of Politics.
19 West 4th Street, Rm. 417.
New York, NY – 10012.

Summer 2016 Address:

FGV – Sao Paulo
Avenida Paulista, 1471. 1st. floor.
01311-927 – Tel: +55 (11) 3799 – 3755

Office Hours: Wednesdays, from 9:30 to 11:30am.

Email: umberto [dot] mig [at] nyu [dot] edu.

Get in touch

I’ll be presenting my work at the following places:

During the Summer, from May to August, I’ll be a Stanton Fellow at FGV in Sao Paulo, Brazil.